revisited hybrid situations, 13 and no federal court has justified strict scrutiny of a free-exercise claim based on the hybrid-rights theory alone. 14 A near majority of federal circuit courts have dismissed the hybrid-rights precedent acknowledged in Smith as "completely illogical" dictum. 15 Even those circuits that nominally permit hybrid claims struggle to employ a consistent, workable standard for assessing such claims. 16 The Supreme Court's sole discussion of hybrid rights after it decided Smith falls within one paragraph of Justice David Souter's concurrence in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, in which he denigrated Smith and its hybrid exception as "untenable."
17 Justice Souter further derided the exception as either too large or too insignificant to exempt certain free-exercise claimants from laws of general applicability. 18 These criticisms provided the foundation for the rationales articulated by those circuits rejecting the hybrid-rights exception. 16. Although the D.C. Circuit entertains hybrid-rights claims-provided an independently viable companion claim is joined with the free-exercise claim-it has not elaborated on how to evaluate such claims. See, e.g., EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (demonstrating the existence of a hybrid claim within the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause by successfully establishing that the "EEOC's attempt to enforce Title VII would both burden Catholic University's right of free exercise and excessively entangle the Government in religion"); see also infra Part I.E. Only the Tenth Circuit developed a doctrine of analysis for hybrid rights, which assessed whether the companion claim to the free-exercise claim is "colorable" enough to suggest a constitutional violation on its own. Without hybrid analysis, victims of subtle religious discrimination lack the "affirmative individual liberty" guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause, which would be necessary to assert a claim against the government. 21 Additionally, without such analysis those cases that the Supreme Court distinguished as hybrids in Smith lose their precedential value despite the Court's expressly preserving them. 22 Absent a recognition of and standard for hybrid rights condoned by precedent and responsive to critics, the Free Exercise Clause stands reduced as only a weak guardian of religious liberty. 23 conclusion that Smith's treatment of hybrid-rights claims is dicta). Every circuit court that has rejected hybrid rights has cited to Kissinger. See 23. Multiple scholarly articles discuss hybrid rights from a variety of perspectives, but none have identified a standard from Supreme Court precedent in light of Justice Souter's criticism. Instead, the vast majority of articles either consider Smith's language and its implications, or explain why a particular circuit's approach taken is preferable for hybrid rights. 24 This Comment then addresses Justice Souter's criticism of the hybrid rights in Smith and the credibility his critique offers to circuit courts that reject or ignore hybrid analysis. After exploring both sides of the hybrid-rights argument, this Comment describes the different approaches taken by circuit courts wrestling with hybrid analysis. From these varied approaches, this Comment demonstrates the necessity of a hybrid analysis, and argues that the Court's treatment of hybrid-rights precedent in Smith, considered with the Court's hybrid analysis, provides an appropriate standard. This Comment tests that standard against Justice Souter's criticisms, and explains how the Court could have found a successful hybrid-rights claim in CLS. Finally, this Comment concludes that the Supreme Court should reaffirm hybrid-rights claims and the existing evaluative standard, and encourages religious-liberty plaintiffs to bring claims that can resolve the remaining interstices in hybrid-rights analysis.
I. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND ASSESSMENTS OF HYBRID CLAIMS

A. A Maculate Conception: Smith Carves out Hybrid Rights
In the late 1980s, the Employment Division of Oregon's Department of Human Resources refused to provide unemployment benefits to two individuals who were fired for consuming peyote. 25 Challenging the denial, these individuals argued that their consumption of the hallucinogen was sacramental and, accordingly, protected by the Free Exercise Clause. The clause accordingly has been used to prohibit government-compelled affirmation of religious belief, proscribing or prohibiting particular forms of religious expression, or the government lending its weight to a given side within an intra-religious dogmatic dispute. 28 Yet, the Court in Smith considered the respondents' argument-that the Free Exercise Clause mandates a religiousbased exemption to a facially nondiscriminatory and generally applied law that forbids performance of an act required by their religion-to go "one large step further" than the clause's textual commission.
29
After excluding exemption as a form of relief available to the respondents, the Court distinguished earlier precedent that had granted such relief so prohibited by Smith's rule. 30 The Court clarified that these prior cases possessed exemption-worthy claims because the Free Exercise Clause did not act alone, but rather conjoined with constitutional rights protected by the First Amendment or the constitutionally recognized parental right-so-called hybrid situations.
31
These companion claims protected different rights-the First Amendment's "communicative activit[ies]" of speech, press, and association, 32 the claimant's peyote use to their free-exercise argument. Id. at 874-75. The Court's explanation of this history suffices for the purposes of this Comment. When the Oregon Supreme Court ultimately found the Oregon criminal statute invalid as applied to the sacramental consumption of peyote under the Free Exercise Clause and ruled that the law could not deny them unemployment benefits on those grounds, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the case. Id. at 876. Using the argument vindicated by Sherbert v. Verner, respondents asserted that Oregon's criminal statute substantially burdened their religious practice and, therefore, required justification from a compelling government interest to sustain the prohibition. Id. at 882-83 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1968)).
27. Id. at 877 (quoting Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 559-60 (1993) (Souter, J., concurring) (referring to Smith's assertion that free exercise is not offended by the enforcement of a neutral and generally applicable law as a "noncontroversial principle").
28. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877; see also, McConnell, supra note 3, at 1425 (discussing the historical underpinnings of religious free-exercise protections and their influence on the founding generation).
29. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878. However, the Court hedged its holding as a textual matter when it conceded that the respondents' proposed reading was "permissible," but ultimately concluded, "we do not think the words must be given that meaning." Id. (emphasis added).
30. The Smith Court found in each precedential case involving hybrid rights that its analysis had focused specifically on the other constitutional principles involved, rather than free exercise. 37 After explaining how it had previously resolved hybrid claims, the Court applied the hybrid requirements to the facts presented in Smith.
38
Finding that ingesting peyote is unconnected to any communicative activity or parental right, the Court held that no hybrid claim existed.
39
B. Separating Sheep from Goats 40 : Hybrid-Rights Successes and Failures
In explicating the free-exercise doctrine, the Court in Smith cited Supreme Court precedent that both upheld and rejected hybrid claims, and set forth the factual scenarios in which each claim arose. 44 In Cantwell, the Court invalidated a Connecticut statute that provided an administrator the discretion to refuse a license to solicit support for a religious cause if he believed the cause to in fact be non-religious. 45 Although the Court by its words based this holding on the "freedom to act" under the Free Exercise Clause, the particular act involved was solicitation of support for religious views-an act that by its very nature constitutes a communicative activity. 46 The Court additionally held that that the petitioner's conviction for breach of the peace must be set aside. 47 The Court reasoned that prosecutions for breaching the peace at common law of a general and undefined nature countered the interest of the United States in protecting the free exercise of religion and "the freedom to communicate information and opinion." 48 The Court in Smith interpreted Cantwell to stand for the principle that the First Amendment prevents prosecution of religious free exercise when doing so would contemporaneously abridge the freedom to communicate information within the Free Speech Clause. 49 Murdock v. Pennsylvania involved another solicitation statute, which required anyone soliciting orders for goods and other items in Jeannette, Pennsylvania to pay a fee and obtain a license. 50 
Communicative Cases Decided Based on the Freedom of Speech Alone
In Smith, the Court considered certain exemption-granting cases to be hybrid situations because, although they exclusively involved a free-speech claim, the cases factually arose from burdens placed on the respective claimants' religious exercise. 55 The 63. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632 (finding that the flag salute is a "primitive but effective way of communicating ideas"); accord Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715 ("Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life-indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view-to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable.").
64. Wooley, 430 U.S. at 714 (analyzing the issue in terms of "the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking" because they implicate "the broader concept of 'individual freedom of mind'" (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 637)); Barnette, 319 U.S at 634-35 (noting that of his daily life . . . to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view that he finds unacceptable" through such symbols. 65 In both Barnette and Wooley, the Court held that the Bill of Rights prevents government officials from forcing an individual to symbolically affirm a belief contrary to his conscience-a holding compelled by the values protected under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. The Smith Court also cited to Prince v. Massachusetts; 68 however, in that case the Court did not find a successful hybrid claim involving parental rights and consequently upheld a neutral, generally applicable law as applied to the claimant, who professed religious motivations.
69
In Yoder, an Amish family sought to exempt its children from a state law compelling secondary education because such education violated their way of the issue did not turn on the religious motives of the appellees, but rather the Court's decision rested on whether or not the state had the power in the first place to make the salute a legal duty). If government admits that God (whomever that may be) is sovereign, then it also admits that its claims on the loyalty and obedience of the citizens is partial and instrumental. Even the mighty democratic will of the people is, in principle, subordinate to the commands of God, as heard and understood in the individual conscience. In such a nation, with such a commitment, totalitarian tyranny is a philosophical impossibility. (1944)). The Court does not discuss Prince in the context of other hybrid situations, but rather discusses it in support of its general prohibition against religious exemptions to laws of general applicability. Id. However, by the Supreme Court's own terms in Prince, a hybrid situation was in fact involved. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165 ("On one side is the obviously earnest claim for freedom of conscience and religious practice. With it is allied the parent's claim to authority in her own household and in the rearing of her children." (emphasis added)).
69. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 165-67, 170. life as members of the Amish religion.
70
The Court recognized that an infringement on the "rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children. . . . combined with a free exercise claim" warranted strict scrutiny.
71
Because the state law at issue in Yoder did not satisfy strict scrutiny, the Court granted the Yoders an exemption to compulsory education.
72
The Prince case, like Yoder, presented a hybrid claim involving free exercise combined with the parental rights associated with raising children.
73
Massachusetts labor laws prevented a mother from directing her children to distribute religious literature in the streets. 74 Although the Court recognized the right of "parents to give [their children] religious training and to encourage them in the practice of religious belief," 75 the school's nondiscrimination policy. 79 When the Supreme Court considered whether a public law school could require adherence to the policy as a condition for official student-group recognition, the Court considered the policy's requirements and its implementation. 80 The policy prevented student groups from discriminating, inter alia, on the basis of religion in membership and leadership selection. 81 The law school admitted that although it refused to recognize CLS, a religious group, the school's nondiscrimination policy allowed other types of groups "to select officers and members who were dedicated to a particular set of ideals or beliefs." 82 The law school's denial of recognition prohibited CLS from accessing the University's communication mediums and school funding. 83 Although the Supreme Court entertained CLS's many First Amendment claims, 84 the Court quickly dismissed the free-exercise claim in a footnote, citing to the rule in Smith that "the Free Exercise Clause does not inhibit enforcement of otherwise valid regulations" of general application that incidentally burden religious conduct. 85 According to the Court, giving CLS a free-exercise exemption from the law school's policy would give it "preferential, not equal treatment."
86 CLS did not raise the issue of Smith's hybrid-situations exception, 87 and the Court did not mention it. ("CLS's bylaws, Hastings explained, did not comply with the Nondiscrimination Policy because CLS barred students based on religion and sexual orientation."). For the purposes of this Comment, the CLS discussion will focus on the "nondiscrimination policy" as written, rather than the "all comers" policy that informed the majority opinion and had been adopted through the parties' factual stipulation. See id. at 2984. CLS was denied registered-student-organization status under the nondiscrimination policy-only that denial, if anything, would implicate a hybrid claim. The majority evaluated the claim under the "all comers" policy because of the prospective relief requested by CLS; therefore, their concerns regarding the nondiscrimination policy are not implicated here. 101 First, the Smith Court's conception of a hybrid claim as simply one that implicates a second constitutional right in conjunction with free exercise would create an exception so vast that it swallows the rule. 102 He noted that "free speech and associational rights are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual" at issue in Smith.
103 Justice Souter reasoned that if the mere presence of a companion constitutional claim defeats Smith's general rule, then Smith was a hybrid case and the rule that courts take from it does not distinguish hybrid claims-it is consumed by them.
104 Second, if a claimant were exempt from a neutral law of general applicability in a so-called hybrid claim under a different constitutional provision, then there would be no need to include the free-exercise claim because the claim under the companion provision would be adequate to achieve the same result. 105 Therefore, according to Justice Souter, the hybrid analysis is not only absent from the relevant case law, but attempting to implement any analysis from Smith's parsing would be logically indefensible.
106
E. Serving Many Masters: Circuits Wrestle with the Arguments
The disputed validity of hybrid rights within free-exercise jurisprudence inspired a convoluted and increasingly skeptical circuit-court reception. 109 In Kissinger, the Sixth Circuit characterized the hybrid-rights doctrine as a theory that would strike down an ordinance on free-exercise grounds "if it implicates other constitutional rights," but preserves the ordinance as constitutional if the ordinance only implicates the Free Exercise Clause. 110 The court considered this "completely illogical," arguing that Justice Souter's critique strengthened this conclusion.
111 Rather than wrestle with the Court's words, the Kissinger approach simply considers Smith's hybrid-rights language to be dicta until the Supreme Court further 108. 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1991) (finding the hybrid-rights concept "completely illogical").
109. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 440 n.45 (9th Cir. 2008) (implying that Smith's hybrid-rights doctrine is dicta because it has been widely criticized and "no court has ever allowed a plaintiff to bootstrap a free exercise claim in this manner"); Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F. elaborates on the issue. 112 The Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits took a step back from the Sixth Circuit's skepticism and acknowledged the possibility of hybrid claims; however, these circuits ultimately shied away from attempting to define an evaluative standard.
113
In contrast, the First Circuit suggested that a hybrid-rights claim could be successful if a claimant argued a free-exercise claim in conjunction with an independently protected companion constitutional claim-a constitutional claim, other than free exercise, which can be viably raised from the facts. 114 The D.C. Circuit also seems to have embraced the independently protected approach, 115 but has only used the approach in dicta. 116 Opinions from these circuits do not clearly demonstrate whether an independently protected claim is actually required with a free-exercise claim for a hybrid challenge. The First Circuit will likely not clarify the issue because it recently disputed the assertion that it had ever actually considered the hybrid-rights theory. Rather than proving the independent viability of the companion claim, the "colorable claim" approach simply requires the companion claim have "a fair probability or likelihood, but not a certitude, of success on the merits."
122
The fact-specific nature of this case-by-case approach inhibits the articulation of a clear rule. 123 Even with the standard, the Tenth Circuit has yet to decide a case on the grounds of a hybrid-rights claim. 134 Some scholars and courts might dismiss hybrid-rights theory under the argument that the Court in Smith created a distinction merely to reason around precedent that would have otherwise mandated an undesired result. 135 Yet lower court judges "charged with resolving a specific controversy . . . lack the luxury that the ivory tower provides." 136 The role of these courts is not to right the potential wrongs of Supreme Court case law, but "to make sense of a confusing doctrinal situation-to make the pieces fit."
137 By ignoring hybrid precedent, which the Supreme Court expressly preserved in Smith, circuit courts treat controlling law with improper casualness 138 and diminish the import of free-exercise exemptions, especially given Smith's already limited role for such exemptions.
139
B. Searching for a Standard in Smith
In addition to serving as the proverbial display case for hybrid rights, the decision in Smith also provides the blueprints for the hybrid-rights analysis. The Court's description of successful hybrid precedent highlights the contours 133. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. The Court's analysis of the fired employees' claim suggests that its non-hybrid status was dispositive:
The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right. Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation. We have never held that, and decline to do so now. First, a free-exercise claim can join a companion constitutional claim pertaining to a communicative activity (free speech, free press, and perhaps association) or a parental right. 141 The Court's language in Smith leaves the door open for potential non-communicative and non-parental companion claims, but Smith's reasoning may limit companion claims to those two varieties.
142 Second, a communicative activity serving as a companion claim must be connected to "the communication of religious beliefs," and a parental right must be connected to "the raising of one's children in those beliefs."
143 This nexus between the free-exercise claim and the companion claim allows the analysis to "specifically advert to the non-free exercise principle involved" 144 from the free-exercise claim. 145 The Court does not explicitly address whether the non-free-exercise principle must be an independently protected companion claim or simply a colorable-enough violation of a constitutional protection. 146 However, its language does suggest See, e.g., Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1208 (9th Cir. 1999) (refusing to find a hybrid-rights claim implicating both interstate travel and free exercise because the interstate-travel claim was "utterly meritless"). However, Smith confined its speculation of other hybrid claims to First Amendment communicative concerns. 494 U.S. at 882 ("And it is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of association grounds would likely be reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns." (citing Roberts v. U.S. Jaycess, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984))). The Court resolved that the facts did not fit a hybrid mold because the free-exercise claim was unconnected to "any communicative activity or parental right." Id.
143. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882. 144. See id. at 881 n.1. 145. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513-14 (1997) (construing Smith's reference to hybrid rights as one where the free-exercise claim has to rely on another constitutional claim at stake).
146. However, Smith's citation to hybrid cases decided "exclusively" upon the companion claim cuts against the colorable-claim approach because the cited cases clearly involved more than a colorable claim. See 215-19 (1972) . For a detailed discussion of the implications involved with accepting the colorable-claim approach to hybrid claims on that the companion claim must at least plausibly exist. 147 Additionally, mere religious belief, or the centrality of the implicated religious activity to one's religious beliefs, is not a part of the companion claim.
148
C. Smith's Cited Precedent Refines the Analysis
Smith divided hybrid precedent into three variations: communicative activities, parental rights, and cases in which the decisions exclusively rely on another constitutional right but involve religious freedom.
149
These three categories possess one commonality that functions both as a guidepost and a limit to the hybrid analysis-all successful hybrid cases decided in the Supreme Court challenged laws requiring affirmative compulsion "under threat of criminal sanction to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of [the claimant's] religious beliefs." 150 As suggested in Mundock and Cantwell, the affirmative compulsion in the communicative context must rise to the level of censorship. 151 In Barnette and Wooley, cases that exclusively relied on free-speech grounds, this compulsion took the form of state-imposed symbolism. 148. See id. at 886-87 ("It is no more appropriate for judges to determine the 'centrality' of religious beliefs before applying a 'compelling interest' test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the 'importance' of ideas before applying the 'compelling interest' test in the free speech field. What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is 'central' to his personal faith?").
149. Id. at 881-82. 150. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 (exempting Amish claimants from compulsory school attendance because mandating secondary education interfered with the religious development of Amish children); accord Wooley, 430 U.S. at 706, 717 (holding that New Hampshire was prohibited from enforcing criminal sanctions against Jehovah's Witnesses who covered the state motto on their license plates because the motto was repugnant to their religious beliefs); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624, 626-29 (exempting Jehovah Witnesses from a public school resolution that compelled a flag salute and pledge by threatening prosecution of the child and parents for insubordination, when such consents were fundamentally at odds with their religious beliefs); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 107-08, 113 (1943) (invalidating the enforcement of a license tax on the solicitation of orders for goods as applied to Jehovah's Witnesses distributing religious literature because the tax effectively censured their free exercise); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305 (invalidating the enforcement of criminal sanctions against Jehovah's Witnesses for failure to comply with a mandatory licensing system for religious solicitation because the system permitted censorship of religion as the means of determining its "right to survive").
151. See Murdock, 319 U.S. at 113 ("The power to impose a license tax on the exercise of these freedoms is indeed as potent as the power of censorship . . . ."); Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 305 ("Such a censorship of religion as the means of determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment . . . .").
152. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 715; Barnette, 319 U.S. at 632.
The parental-rights category contains analogous qualifications for the affirmative compulsion required to garner the hybrid exemption. Importantly, the Yoder case clarified that its holding "in no degree depends on the assertion of the religious interest of the child . . . it is [the parents'] right of free exercise, not that of their children" at issue because the State was prosecuting the parents, not the child. 153 The Court's focus on the rights of the parents in Yoder reveals the nature of the improper state infringement in that case-the state's compulsory policy "prevented these Amish parents from making fundamental decisions regarding their children's religious upbringing and effectively overrode their ability to pass their religion on to their children." 154 Therefore, the parental right implicated in a successful hybrid case is narrowed to instances where the state's affirmative compulsion renders it nearly impossible for parents to guide the religious future of their children.
155
The Prince case further narrowed the scope of affirmative-compulsion hybrid-rights exemption when the Court noted that parental rights are limited to some extent by the state's proffered interests in child health and public safety.
156 Thus, the Court will not grant an exemption for a parental-rights free-exercise claim when the interests of the state in the child's health and the public welfare outweigh those rights.
157
Both the communicative-activity and parental-rights categories of hybrid precedent reveal the significance of raising a companion claim with a free-exercise claim-but for the free-exercise implication, the state's affirmative compulsion could be constitutional. context, the Murdock Court noted that religious claimants require more protection from a tax on pamphleteering than secular, commercial speech because of the censorship on religious speech. 159 A secular claimant would not necessarily receive the same level of protection as that provided to a religious claimant in such a case. 160 In the parental-rights context, a parent's claim would not inhibit reasonable regulation if the parent based his or her objection on "purely secular considerations." 161 State interests may still intercede in the context of health and public safety to temper the plus factor that the Free Exercise Clause provides. 162 With this analysis, the hybrid-rights doctrine recognizes a significant exception to Smith's general free-exercise rule because the claimant's free-exercise interest in the companion activity "saves" the claimant from what could otherwise be a constitutional state regulation of the companion activity. 160. Id. at 110-11. Although it is true that "the pamphlets of Thomas Paine were not distributed free of charge," and are thus afforded a similar level of protection as religious publications, this language simply proves that political speech could also serve as a "plus factor," much like religion did in Murdock. See id. However, this does not dispute that religion did provide the Murdock claimant a plus that, as the Court says, "retailers or wholesalers of books" would not have. See id. Therefore, the opinion's language reveals that a speech claim would necessarily give a claimant the same type of "plus" factor that religion would always give a claimant. Id. at 111-12.
161. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. 162. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-67 (1944) . 163. See supra Parts II.A-B. Although the Court has yet to entertain a hybrid claim involving a sect, such as secular humanism, that does not profess a belief in the existence of God, the sole case on point fell into the uncontroversial territory of the free-exercise prohibition against compelled belief. See Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 & n.11 (1961) (reaffirming that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits states and the federal government from either "constitutionally forc[ing] a person" to believe or disbelieve a religion or aiding God-believing religions against other religions, such as secular humanism). As the Court implied that secular humanism was a religion, the hybrid-rights exception would likely protect it even though secular humanism rejects traditional religious concepts. See id. at 495 n.11. The potential for this expansion of the exception is not likely to compromise the exception's limits because the hybrid analysis evaluates the extent to which a state interferes with a constitutionally protected activity implicated by the claimant's free exercise, rather than the content of the particular religious belief. See supra Part II.C. [Vol. 61:265
D. The Analytical Sequence for Hybrid Rights
Smith's language and hybrid-rights precedent provide a test for hybrid rights that is divided into three "lines of cases" with common threshold requirements. 164 
Threshold Requirements
As a threshold matter, a successful hybrid-rights claim must possess either an independently viable constitutional claim related to a communicative activity protected by the First Amendment or a constitutionally recognized parental right. 165 Either companion claim must possess a certain nexus with the free-exercise claim that pivots the analysis toward the companion claim. 166 The regulated activity must implicate both the free-exercise claim and the companion claim in a way that accords with the required nexus for a communicative or parental-rights claim. 167 The state's regulation must place an affirmative burden on free exercise that compels the claimant to perform some act. 168 Assuming satisfaction of the threshold determinations, the analysis then branches off into one of the three categories identified in Smith. 169 
Category 1: Communicative-Activity Hybrid Cases
In the communicative context, a free-exercise claim links with communicative claims that evoke religious beliefs. 170 This category requires the imposition of an affirmative obligation on a communicative act involving religious beliefs that exacts a burden on their free exercise. 171 Significant interference with the ability to communicate religious beliefs is necessary to reach the required level of burdening.
172 Smith emphasizes that this part of the hybrid exception protects the ability to communicate information about religion, not solely the ability to communicate. 173 If the imposition is akin to censorship, the combination of the religious implication with the communicative activity exempts the claimant from the law. 
Category 2: Cases Exclusive to Free Speech
If in satisfying the threshold requirements, the state law requires an affirmative compulsion from the claimant in the form of a symbolic utterance that implies acceptance of an ideology as belief, 175 then this communicative case is resolvable exclusively on free speech grounds and falls outside the scope of the hybrid analysis. 
Category 3: Parental-Rights Cases
When a state law implicates parental rights and free exercise, the free-exercise claim connects with the parental-rights claim if the regulated activity involves child rearing in religion. 177 However, the reasoning in Yoder does not allow a religious claimant to withhold children from a compulsory activity simply because the parent's religion conflicts with the law. 178 Rather, the compelled act must override the parents' right to pass their religious beliefs and practice on to their children. 179 
A. CLS Shows the Peril of Free Exercise Without Hybrid Rights
The CLS decision demonstrates both the significance of ignoring hybrid claims and the effect of such claims. 182 If the Court had considered the hybrid standard, then it never could have relegated CLS's free-exercise argument to one footnote. 183 In fact, the proposed standard could have provided an avenue for CLS's success under a hybrid theory considering the nondiscrimination policy.
CLS would have had to first demonstrate a plausible companion constitutional claim-either a communicative activity or parental right implicated with their free-exercise claim.
184
The CLS majority correctly recognized the communicative activity of "expressive association" within the case facts.
185 Because "expressive association in this case is 'the functional equivalent of speech itself,'" 186 a viable companion, communicative claim existed, provided that CLS had an implicated free-exercise interest with the requisite nexus to its communicative claim. 187 The communicative activity at issue pertained to the communication of religious beliefs through CLS's advocacy of its statement of faith. The law school required that CLS open its doors to all students regardless of religious beliefs to gain recognized organization status and university benefits.
188
Such a requirement is religion on to their children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944) (noting that a parent cannot claim freedom from a compulsory act such as child vaccination due to child health and public safety concerns); see also Prince, 321 U.S. at 168-69 (holding that the state interests in child health and safety in preventing certain forms of child labor superseded a parental interest in passing religion on to children).
181. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214 ("[I]n order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause.").
182 tantamount to an affirmative compulsion because CLS would be forced to set aside its statement of faith and would no longer be able to advocate its religious beliefs effectively. 189 If CLS had met the hybrid threshold requirements, then analysis would have adverted to the non-free-exercise principle 190 -CLS's communicative companion claim. 191 Under its nondiscrimination policy, 192 the law school prohibited CLS, as an official student group, from denying membership or leadership roles to those who did not adhere to its statement of faith. 193 The law school's denial of official statutes, and the consequent denial of access to the schools' communicative forums, implicates relatively straightforward viewpoint discrimination because it came while granting political, social, and cultural groups official status even though they deny similar statuses to students based on ideological beliefs. 194 this status because its statement of faith did not conform with the nondiscrimination policy implicates the concerns that those avenues would be used to communicate the beliefs contained in the statement of Smith. The statement of faith requires, among other things, adherence to Christian teachings regarding One God in Three Persons, accepting Jesus Christ as humanity's savior, and the active presence of the Holy Spirit in one's life. Id. at 2980 n.3 189. Id. at 2980-81. Had a hybrid-rights argument been considered, CLS would likely have had to address why the interference on its free exercise still rose to the same level as the hybrid cases Smith recognized, even though no apparent threat of criminal sanctions existed. CLS could plausibly respond that the focus of the hybrid analysis here is on the level of imposition on its exercise and whether it rises to affirmative compulsion-not whether the State choose to classify that imposition as criminal. The hypothetical argument above proceeds on CLS reasoning in this fashion. 191. The hybrid analysis does not resolve the dispute over whether a companion claim must be independently protected by the Constitution or simply raise a colorable violation. See supra Part II.B. However, a hybrid-rights claimant would be wise to analyze a companion claim under the higher standard because an independently protected claim is certainly colorable, but the opposite is not necessarily true.
192. See supra note 79 (discussing why the nondiscrimination policy is considered in this Comment rather than the "all comers" policy).
193. CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 2980. 194. See id. at 3010 (Alito, J., dissenting). The First Amendment's opposition to viewpoint discrimination is considered a "bedrock principle" by the Supreme Court. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable." (citations omitted)). As Justice Samuel Alito, Jr. noted for the dissent, the Court did not try to defend the law school's nondiscrimination policy as constitutional because any attempt to do so would have failed. See CLS, 130B S. Ct. at 3010. The language of the nondicrimination policy demonstrates the law school's intent to disfavor religious groups specifically, while amounting to "patent viewpoint discrimination." See id.
Importantly, the standard provides a response to Justice Souter's prominent two-pronged critique. 202 Unlike the case-by-case colorable-claim theory, developed to reconcile Smith's critics with Smith's language, 203 this standard strives to provide the missing analysis through the hybrid precedent confirmed in Smith. 204 Having an evaluative standard gives circuit courts appropriate guidance through binding, precedential case law. 205 The recognition of hybrid rights and their evaluative standard would bolster efforts by the circuits to protect those hybrid rights while awaiting a doctrine from the Supreme Court for evaluating the claims. 206 During the intervening time, religious-liberty plaintiffs should work to expel the ambiguity remaining within the standard. Although some precedential cases successfully invoking hybrid rights have suggested a requirement that the state demonstrate an interest rising above a rational basis, 207 the Court should make it clear that hybrid scrutiny is indeed strict scrutiny, rather than a variation of intermediate scrutiny. 208 Additionally, the sufficiency of a colorable companion claim to trigger the hybrid analysis 209 and the limitation of companion claims to communicative activities and parental rights, are issues left undetermined in successful hybrid precedent. 210 The former issue is consequential to the characterization of a potential hybrid case, as CLS confirms: the free-exercise claim adds a plus factor that could otherwise be unavailable on purely secular grounds. 222 When a state's action attempts to override the parental interest in a child's religious upbringing, barring safety considerations, a parent can bring a claim that would not likely stand on purely secular grounds. 223 Similarly, the communicative context shows that less protected forms of speech, such as commercial speech, could never provide the same degree of relief that religiously based communication can under the hybrid analysis. 224 For example, in CLS, a non-religious school group would be unable to engage in the religious discrimination that, under a hybrid analysis, CLS could engage in, even if it wanted to or thought it necessary. 225 IV. CONCLUSION So long as Smith's rule prohibiting religious exemptions to neutral, generally applicable laws controls free-exercise claims, the Court's only recognized exception must possess a clear standard. Reading successful hybrid-rights precedent through Smith's lens reveals a standard comporting with the Court's language in Smith and illuminating circuit court ambiguity. Most importantly, it provides a vibrant avenue of relief for the constitutional right given first billing, but secondary treatment, 226 in the Bill of Rights.
